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Abstract
This paper investigates whether recourse to a consultant always enhances decision making. Advice
given by a consultant changes the manager’s belief about his own decision-making ability. This change
in belief alters the manager’s incentives to make a decision. Taking into account this eﬀect, we
characterize the contracts that the ﬁrm must oﬀer to the manager when a consultant with a given
expertise is hired. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the beneﬁtc u r v eo ft h eﬁrm may decrease as the consultant
expertise increases, even if there is no consulting fee. Moreover, we show that the value of advice
depends on the “good ﬁt” between the informativeness of the consultant and the manager’s incentives
to reach the right decision.
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1PRN: What can companies do to become better clients, better able to appreciate and use their advisors
A.S.: The ﬁrst thing is, really good clients are great learners - they have a learning attitude. If you
fundamentally get yourself into, “I’m going to learn from this”, it’s going to open you a lot.
-Dialog between consultant Andrew Sobel and Public Relation News (Sept. 2000).
1 Introduction
At ﬁrst sight, the description of the relationship between a consultant and his client appears to be easy
to sketch. The consultant helps the client solve a decision-making problem. Thus a simple way to
consider professional advice activity is that the client buys an item (information) from a consultant;
this relationship can be summarized by a simple transfer of information from a consultant to his client.
The greater the expertise of the consultant on the decision problem at stake, the more valuable is the
information that he delivers to the decision-maker.
However, managers and professional consultants know that things are not that simple. At least two
points can be made to describe the advice process more realistically.
First, in many contexts, decision-makers tend to have an already formed opinion about the decision
they are willing to make. For instance, a manager who wants to merge her ﬁrm with another company
may have some idea about how to proceed. She may even ﬁnd that, given the corporate culture of her
ﬁrm, one particular ﬁrm may be a superior choice for a successful merger. Of course, she may forget
crucial points in her analysis and her opinion may be weak or wrong. Thus, without ruling out the
possibility for perfect ignorance, our starting point is that a manager being advised may have an opinion
about the decision she has to make.
Second, in any decision-making problem, incentive aspects are never absent from the decision-making
process and will greatly inﬂuence the quality of the decision made. A decision-maker, uncertain about her
level of expertise, can always exert eﬀort to overcome her lack of expertise. “Advised” decision-making
processes are not exceptions to the rule and involve incentive problems on the part of the decision-maker
(and probably on the part on the consultant). Consultants often deliver general advice that is sometimes
out of touch with the ﬁrm’s speciﬁcity. Managers have to understand whether those advice is relevant for
their organization; this is not an eﬀort-free exercise. Consultants’ specialists agree that the determinants
of a successful mission are partly independent of the consultant’s expertise and depend crucially on the
client’s behavior. The success of a mission depends on the client’s incentives to be involved in the search
for an eﬀective solution to the problem of the ﬁrm.
2When those two points are taken into account, the decision-making process becomes one in which
one expert (the consultant) advises another expert (the manager) who will face the consequences of her
decision.
After, receiving the advice, the manager must decide whether or not to enhance her decision. For
instance, the advice can take the form of a written report delivered to the manager. The manager can
then decide to superﬁcially read the report and follow the advice without criticism, or she can try to
improve on that advice and incorporate, for instance, relevant informations she knows about her ﬁrm.
In the merger example mentioned above, the manager may acquire some culture about merger processes,
learn the points that are crucial for successful mergers, and then match those points with what she
knows about her ﬁrm. There is clearly an incentive question involved here, but the exact nature of the
incentive problem can only be addressed by further investigating the eﬀect of the advice on the manager’s
incentives.
When the manager is uncertain about her exact decision-making talent, the information received
from the consultant alters her perception of her own decision-making talent and her incentives to reach
a decision.
Indeed, if the advice signiﬁcantly departs from the manager’s prior opinion, then her perception of
her expertise tends to be low and she is thus willing to work hard to compensate for her lack of talent;
talent and hard work are substitutes in our setting. In this case, advice will boost managerial incentives
for the search for information.
Conversely, if the advice turns out to be in accordance with the manager’s opinion, we expect her to
have few incentives to analyze the consultant’s report in depth, because a deep analysis is not likely to
alter her ﬁnal decision. Thus, “consensus” tends to generate few incentives for decision-making.
The fact that the advice endogenizes the manager’s incentives for decision-making is a consequence of
the two points introduced earlier, and it is a key aspect of the present work. To summarize, the economic
value of advice depends not only on the person who gives it, but also on the one who receives it.
The purpose of our paper is to integrate the aspects discussed above into a model of decision-making
with advice. The model studied here involves a principal (e.g., a ﬁrm or a CEO) who decides to hire
a consultant to advise an agent (e.g., a CEO or a division manager) in a decision-making problem.
The decision-making process is a period of time during which, after the report has been made by the
consultant, the manager can deepen her knowledge and understanding of the problem. We assume that
the decision to improve her expertise and to forge a new opinion involves some unobservable actions;
there is thus a moral hazard component. The ﬁrm proposes an incentive contract to the manager to
reach the most accurate decision possible. This contractual approach allows us to describe the eﬀect of
3the informativeness of the advice on managerial incentives. The “private benchmarking” of the manager’s
talent appears to be crucial because, it is then possible to discriminate between managers who receive
“bad news” about their talent and those who receive “good news” from the consultant. The former
should be given strong incentives, whereas the latter should be given weak incentives. The help of the
consultant is, thus, twofold. It enhances the probability of good decision-making - the traditional role of
a consultant - and it may also play a key role in targeting incentives for decision-making.
Several results emerge from the analysis of this setup. We show that if the ﬁrm wants the manager
to have a say in the decision-making process, and be able to fruitfully criticize an advice given by a
consultant, the ﬁrm should choose the manager’s incentives and the consultant carefully.
More precisely, for the accurateness of a given manager’s opinion and her level of incentives for the
search of information, there exists a unique level of the consultant’s informativeness, such that the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt ﬂow from the decision is maximized. The intuition behind this result can be grasped by ﬁrst
noticing that it is appropriate to incentivize the manager as much as possible when there is a dissent
between her and the consultant. This can only happen when the consultant who is as informative as the
manager. Indeed, with such a consultant, managerial ignorance will be maximum in the case of dissent,
and the manager’s incentives to overcome her ignorance are also bound to be the greatest. However, such
a consultant will perform poorly on the information side, and the ﬁrm also probably wants the consultant
to be as much informative as possible. The choice of the optimal consultant is the result of a trade oﬀ
between these two conﬂicting objectives1.
Surprisingly, the value of the information provided by the consultant can decrease with the informa-
tiveness of the advice delivered, e v e ni ft h ea d v i c ei sf r e eo fc o n s u l t i n gf e e s 2. The beneﬁtc u r v eo ft h e
ﬁrm as a function of the consultant’s expertise appears to be non-monotonic. Therefore, given a manager
with some expertise level and incentives to reach the right decision, there exists a range of consultants’
expertise levels that is strictly ineﬃcient (i.e., that are beaten by a consultant with lower expertise).
In the basic model, we assume that the consultant and manager do make mistakes that are statistically
independent. In a variant of the model, we study the case in which mistakes in the prediction of the
state of nature are correlated. We show that this correlation has a negative eﬀect on incentives since it
1Most of the existing economic literature on advice assumes that the decision-maker is ignorant and that the advisor
“knows” or is more informed. In our work, we do not assume away the fact that the manager can be smarter than the
consultant. The fact that the optimal consultant is more informative than the manager is another result of this paper.
However, we also show that the manager can eventually beneﬁt from an advice less informative than her opinion. This
ﬁnding is close to that of Zabojnik (1998) who ﬁnds that a superior may ﬁnd it worthwhile to delegate to a less-informed
subordinate who will implement his own idea.
2We assume that there is no consulting fee. Any cost from having a consultant is thus endogenous.
4generates two few information searches. Thus, for an equal level of expertise, a consultant with a lower
level of correlation is more valuable to the ﬁrm. This ﬁnding may have an important consequence if we
accept the assumption that opinions tend to be more correlated within than across organizations. Indeed,
in this case, hiring an external consultant constitutes a credible way to increase managerial incentives for
decision-making.
The relationship between the informativeness of the advice and its value for the ﬁrm is conducted
with a binary level of eﬀort in order to provide explicit solutions to the problem. However, the analysis
is also conducted with continuous eﬀort. In this case, we characterize the optimal contract and study the
relationship between the level of eﬀort exerted by the manager and the level of information provided by
the consultant. We ﬁnd that an increase in the informativeness of the advice should be followed by an
increase in managerial eﬀort. We illustrate our ﬁndings in the continuous eﬀort case with a numerical
example and we show that the value of information can still be negative if the advice is free. These
ﬁndings are consistent with the managerial literature which asserts that valuable advice depends not
only on the consultant’s advice but also on the client’s strong involvement in terms of learning eﬀort3.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we relate the model to the economic
literature. Section 3 presents a simple model of information search with binary level of eﬀort. In section
4 we study the case of consultancy and the associated ﬁrm’s incentive problem. We derive explicit
solutions to the incentive scheme problem, and we also study a variant in which mistakes in opinion
are correlated. Section 5 generalizes the model with continuous levels of eﬀort. Section 6 oﬀers future
directions for research and concludes.
2 Related literature
To the best of our knowledge, no theoretical discussions have been devoted to the incentive aspects of
the manager/consultant relationship. However, this work is related to several streams of the economic
literature.
There exist several papers that are mainly concerned with advice. For instance, Calvert (1985) shows
that, in a context of political decision-making, a politician who has a prior opinion on a decision he has
to make should receive advice from an advisor whose opinion tends to be identical to his. The choice of
an advisor biased toward his opinion is justiﬁed by the fact that, in case of disagreement (which is a rare
event), the contradictory advice is very powerful and valuable to the politician, since it can change his
3The managerial literature on this topic is vast. See, for instance, Edvardsson (1989), Fullerton and West (1996), and
Stumpf and Longman (2000).
5point of view. The fact that the optimal advisor should be biased toward the decision-maker opinion is
not a conclusion of our analysis. In fact, the introduction of the incentive aspect in our setting leads to
the opposite conclusion: more potential contradiction between opinions generates more incentives on the
part of the decision-maker.
The seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) has given rise to several contributions on the eco-
nomics of advice. These contributions generally focus on the credibility of the expert whose objectives
diﬀer from those of the decision-maker. Austin-Smith (1993) explores a situation in which an assembly
obtains the advice of two experts who have diﬀering political objectives. The paper analyzes under which
conditions the assembly should ask the experts sequentially rather than simultaneously.
Krishna and Morgan (1999) study a setting in which two perfectly informed but biased experts oﬀer
their advice sequentially to an uninformed decision-maker. They show that asking two experts with
opposing biases may allow the decision-maker to extract all the relevant information.
Another strand of the economic literature is concerned with the study of the transmission of informa-
tion by agents who have career concerns. Ottaviani and Sorensen (1999) study how experts who want to
appear well-informed communicate their information to a decision-maker. Although the experts receive
signals of continuously varying intensity and can freely communicate the direction of their signal and
its intensity, they show that reputational concerns result in the transmission of very coarse information.
Experts are only able, in the most informative equilibrium, to transmit the direction of their signal, but
not the intensity4.
All these models study the strategic transmission of information by the expert, and eventually evaluate
the magnitude of these distortions. Our model takes the informativeness of the information delivered as
given, and studies the behavior of the decision-maker. Our approach can be seen as complementary to
these models.
Moreover and relatedly, these models take for granted that the receiver of advice has no expertise
about the decision making problem. This is well-justiﬁed in a model of political advice, because the
politician is essentially a generalist who needs the advice of a specialist (a scientist, say). We think that
in the case of managerial advice, this assumption is not justiﬁed in many contexts. Although the manager
needs an advice, she has good knowledge of her ﬁrm and its problems, and can eventually disagree with
4Other contributions dealing with decision-making under reputational concern include, among others, Holmstrom and
Ricart y Costa (1986), Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Zweibel (1996), Eﬃnger and Polborn (1998) and Milbourn, Schockley
and Thakor (2001). Also related to reputation and consultancy is the paper of Demsky et al. (1999). This paper analyzes
the organizational practices of ﬁrms that must manage the information of their client (essentially banks, audit ﬁrms and
consultants). The paper shows that the capacity to protect and to control the client information determines the demand for
services that these ﬁrms will have.
6advice given. The possibility of (non) disagreement then plays a crucial role, since it endogenizes future
information searches and analysis.
Our work is also related to the literature that explores the link between the incentives of the agents
and the quantity of information generated by the organization. Crémer (1995) explores a model in which
a principal may be better oﬀ by committing not to acquire information about an agent’s productivity,
although this information has a strictly positive value. In the present setting, we show that even though
the consultant is costless and informative, the principal may optimally refuse this source of information,
as it jeopardizes the agent’s incentives. Dewatripont and Tirole (1989) present a model of advocates
and demonstrate that the creation of advocates for and against issues provides the best incentives to
acquire information when there are competing causes. Osband (1989) presents a model of incentives in
forecasting. In this work, the agent is a risk-neutral forecaster who can reﬁne his forecast at some private
cost. The principal would want to induce the agent to reﬁne his forecast, but neither the cost nor the
precision of the forecast can be veriﬁed5. Optimal incentives schemes for forecasting are derived in this
setting.
In our setting, the manager has an external source of information and the informativeness of the
information strongly shapes her incentives to acquire further information. The non monotonic shape of
the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt curve as a function of the informativeness of the consultant is explained by the eﬀect
of advice on incentives.
3T h e m o d e l
3.1 State of nature and optimal decision
There are one period and two dates t =0and t =1 .
Suppose that the ﬁrm wants a manager to make a decision at date t =1 . Let us assume that there
are two unobservable possible states of nature A and B and each of those states of nature may arise with
equal probability at date 1. We assume that for each state of nature, there exists an appropriate decision.
Let us denote by “a” the decision that should be optimally made if the state of nature is A.O n t h e
other hand, implementing decision “a” whereas the true state of nature is B is considered a managerial
m i s t a k et h a tw i l lb ef o l l o w e db yﬁnancial losses.
Therefore, let us state that an adequate decision ((A,a) or (B,b)) generates a proﬁt ﬂow of G>0
monetary units, while a mistake ((A,b) or (B,a)) generates a loss of L>0.
5Also in a principal-agent setting, Malcomson (1999) presents a more general model in which a risk averse agent must
incur an eﬀort and truthfully reveal the outcome of this eﬀort.
7Of course, the manager is not a perfect decision-maker, and we now describe how the manager makes-
up his mind before making the decision at date 1.
3.2 Type of agent and signal technology
The correctness of the decision of the manager depends on her type as well as on her eﬀort.
We denote by θ ∈ [0,1] the unconditional probability that the manager has the correct type for
the kind of decision she has to make. From now on, we will call θ “the level of expertise” (or simply
“expertise”) of the manager. So with probability θ a manager has the good type and receives a signal
indicating the true state of nature with probability one; for instance, if the underlying state of nature is
A, the manager receives a signal indicating decision a. We slightly abuse notation by directly denoting
this signal a.
When the manager is less talented, which occurs with probability 1 − θ, she just receives a random
signal indicating with equal probability decision “a” or “b”6.
Ex ante, neither the principal nor the agents (i.e., the manager or the consultant) can know whether
the agent is of the right type; that is, whether she always gets the right signal at the ﬁrst time. We
assume that the consultant possesses the same signal technology as the manager, and we denote by λ the
unconditional probability that the consultant is smart. Just before t =1 , another signal may be obtained
by the manager if she exerts a binary eﬀort. The manager may perform either:
• no eﬀort, for which she has no disutility. In this case, the manager obtains exactly the signal she
had obtained at the beginning of the ﬁrst period.
• as t r o n ge ﬀort, for which she has a disutility of 1 monetary unit7. The signal technology has the
following features. If the manager is smart, the second signal is the same as in the beginning of the
ﬁrst period. If the manager is dumb, she obtains a new signal independent from the ﬁrst, and this
signal indicates the true state of nature with probability 1
2 <p<1.
Therefore, by exerting eﬀort and thus obtaining another signal, a manager can improve on the quality
of his decision-making. The existence of this second signal helps us to modelize the fact that talented
managers make the right decisions sooner and with no eﬀort. Thus, in this setting the signal that a
talented manager gets at date t =0is the right one, and is identical to the one she will get at date t = 1
2.
6We will sometimes follow the terminology introduced by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and call the high ability type
decision-maker a “smart” manager whereas we will refer to the low ability type decision-maker as the “dumb” manager.
7T h e r ei sn ol o s so fg e n e r a l i t yi nc onsidering one unit rather than R>0. It is just simpler.
8Conversely, less talented managers tend to have an immediate right opinion less often and must exert
some eﬀort to converge toward the right decision.
We now describe the information sets of the agents, as well as the contracting possibilities of the ﬁrm.
3.3 Information, eﬀort and contracts
The signals obtained by the agents do not constitute hard information in the sense developed by Tirole
(1986). This means that new signals may be forged costlessly by the manager, if necessary. Therefore,
these signals will not be contracted upon by the parties.
The consultant is hired on the consultant’s market, and is paid after he reports to the manager. As
the consultant does not perform any eﬀort, the payment is a ﬁxed amount µ ≥ 0 independent of the
realized state of nature. In the rest of the paper, and as we want to focus on the manager incentive
problem, we will use µ =0to simplify the analysis8. Since the outcome is observable and contractible,
it is possible for the ﬁrm to commit to a payment contingent upon this outcome.
The eﬀort performed by the manager to obtain the second signal is not observable by the ﬁrm.
However, it can be induced by the design of an incentive contract based on the outcome of the decision.
3.4 Timing of events
T h et i m i n go fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s :
1. The nature draws a state of nature, I = {A,B}
2. The manager is proposed a contract that stipulates whether a consultant will be present
and the payments to be made contingent upon the outcome.
3. The manager and the consultant (if present) privately receive a signal, i ∈ {a,b} indicating
the possibly appropriate decision that ﬁts the underlying state of nature9’10. The consultant
8A more complete (and realistic) treatment would involve an ex ante payment µ(λ) > 0, with µ(.) being an increasing
function of the consultant’s ex ante reputation, λ. Any result we get would not be aﬀected if we were to assume that µ was
an increasing function of λ.
9In fact, it does not matter whether the consultant and the manager receive the signal simultaneously or not.
10The assumption that the advice of the consultant is not observable, and hence not contracted upon, could be removed. If
this is done, the manager still has private information on his talent but the set of possible contracts is broader. In particular,
a contract that stipulates a payment contingent upon the signal announced by the consultant and the decision implemented
by the manager would be useful in extracting some of the rent associated with the private information possessed by the
manager. An optimal incentive scheme using the information provided by the consultant would take the following form: if
the manager successfully implements a decision diﬀerent from the one advocated by the consultant, then he would receive
a greater salary than the one received if the decision implemented is identical to the consultant’s advice. We refrain from
9(if present) privately reports his signal to the manager and is paid an amount normalized to
zero.
4. The manager privately decides to obtain another signal; this decision involves a costly
eﬀort.
5. The manager implements her chosen decision, the state of nature is realized and payments
are made according to the contract.
The next section concerns with the benchmark case in which the manager acts alone in the decision-
making.
3.5 The “no-consultant” case
We now consider the case where the ﬁrm must induce the manager to decide alone. We assume that
the ﬁrm ﬁnds it worthwhile to induce the manager to obtain the second signal, and we will provide the
formal condition that insures that the manager will eﬀectively expand the costly eﬀort.
In this context, the manager receives a ﬁrst signal and must decide in the second round whether to
produce an eﬀort which will entitle her to obtain a second signal. We denote by wS
nc the wage given to
the manager if she makes the right decision. The reward wF
nc is given in case of failure.
















subject to the following constraints:
[θ + p(1 − θ)]wS
nc +( 1− p)(1− θ)wF
nc − 1 ≥
£
θ + 1




2 (1 − θ)wF
nc (2)
wS
nc ≥ 0 and wF
nc ≥ 0. (Limited liability constraints)
The objective function states that the manager picks the right decision with probability θ +p(1 − θ).
This is because, with probability θ, she is smart and always receives the right signal. She can also be
dumb with probability 1 − θ, but by exerting eﬀort she is successful with probability p>1
2.A r i g h t
decision generates a proﬁt ﬂow of G>0 and salary wS
nc must be paid to the manager. The manager
picks a wrong decision with probability (1 − p)(1 − θ) and the ﬁrm shows a loss L>0. The salary paid
to the manager is wF
nc in this case.
presenting such an analysis because even if the optimal contract is more sophisticated, the results derived have the same
ﬂavor as the ones we are going to present; some rent is transferred from the manager to the ﬁrm. Moreover, the interpretation
of the model changes if the signal is public, since in this case the ﬁrm is auditing the manager’s talent.
10The incentive constraint (2) states that the manager is willing to exert eﬀort.




(1 − θ)(2p − 1)
and wF∗
nc =0 . (3)
By plugging these optimal salaries into the objective function of the ﬁrm, we easily obtain the equilibrium
proﬁto ft h eﬁrm when no consultant is hired:
B∗
nc =( θ + p(1 − θ))
h




and we can now provide a condition which guarantee that the ﬁrm is willing to induce the manager to
reﬁne his opinion.
Lemma 1 The ﬁrm induces the manager to exert an information search eﬀort when the following con-
dition is veriﬁed:
G + L ≥
4(p+θ−pθ)
(2p−1)2(1−θ)2. (5)
Proof. The proof consists in the computation of the diﬀerence between the beneﬁtt ot h eﬁrm when
the incentive scheme (3) is implemented and the beneﬁt when the manager is not induced to do a search















A simple computation shows that ∆B is positive if the following condition on the parameters is satisﬁed:
G + L ≥
4(p + θ − pθ)
(2p − 1)
2 (1 − θ)
2.
This is condition (5).
From now on, we will assume that condition (5) holds; that is, the parameters of the model are
always such that the ﬁrm wants to induce the manager to obtain another signal when she acts alone.
If this condition is not veriﬁed, the incentive problem of the ﬁrm becomes trivial because payments are
independent of the outcome.
We now turn to the case where a consultant is hired to advise the manager.
4 The case of consultancy
This part concerns the determination and analysis of the optimal contracts oﬀered by the ﬁrm when a
consultant is hired.
11The aim of the following subsection is to explain how many signals should be optimally collected by
the manager. Moreover, although it is not crucial for the results, the merit of this subsection is to explain
and clarify the interaction between the agents. It also explains to what extend each agent participates
in the decision-making process because, as mentioned in the introduction, there is often the problem of
measuring the real inﬂuence of a consultant on the decision-making process.
4.1 Manager and consultant: What does the consultant bring?
In our context, the ﬁrm will have to determine the optimal number of signals before oﬀering an incentive
contract to the manager. Here, we want to abstract from the problem of inducing information acquisition.
Therefore, we focus on the value of an additional signal if the acquisition of this signal is costless.
A signal is worth acquiring if the decision that is taken with this additional signal strictly increases the
expected proﬁt relative to a situation in which the decision is taken only with two signals. For instance,
let us assume that the manager has received i and that the consultant has reported to her signal i.W i t h
those two identical signals the optimal decision of the manager is prone to be action i. Acquiring a third
signal will enhance decision-making, only it changes the decision made by the manager. Thus, if a signal
j is obtained, it must be at least as informative as the two signals ii.
The optimal number of signals that should be obtained by the manager depends on the interplay
between Bayesian learning, the ex ante ability of the agents and the productivity of eﬀort. The following
proposition characterizes the number of signals that the ﬁrm is willing to obtain if those signals are
costless.
Proposition 1 There exist two values of the consultant’s expertise
λ =2 p − 1 and λ =
2p − 1+3 θ − 2pθ
1+θ
,
such that the following statements are true:
• whenever λ < λ , and whatever the ﬁrst two signals, a sequence of three signals always strictly
beneﬁts the ﬁrm.




, a sequence of three signals is worthwhile if the two ﬁrst signals diﬀer whereas
as e q u e n c eo ft w os i g n a l si ss u ﬃcient if they are similar.
• whenever λ > λ , a third signal is never worthwhile; the two ﬁrst signals are always suﬃcient.
Proof. The formal proof is given in the appendix.
12We provide an intuition for proposition 1. If λ =0 , the signal transmitted by the consultant is
non-informative about the true state of nature and acquiring a third signal is always strictly worthwhile.
Continuity implies that, this would be true for small values of λ. The third point is easily understood if one
assumes that λ =1 . In such a case, acquiring a third signal is never worthwhile since the one brought
by the consultant is perfect (i.e., indicate the true state of nature with probability one). Continuity
implies that, this will be true for high values of λ. The last case describes the intermediate case in which
the signal brought by the consultant does not totally dominate the information that the manager can
generate.
The parameters of the model together determine over which regions an information search is optimal.





To make the picture complete, we now provide a result stating the optimal decision that the manager
makes for a given sequence of signal. This optimal decision depends on the sequence of signal obtained,
and on the relative talent of the manager and the consultant.
Corollary 1 (Optimal Decision Rules)
• If the sequence is ij, the optimal decision of the manager is i if λ ≤ θ,a n djo t h e r w i s e .
• If the sequence is ijj, the optimal decision is j.
• If the sequence is iji, the optimal decision is i if λ ≤ λ, and j otherwise.
• If the sequence is iij, the optimal decision is j if λ ≤ λ, and i otherwise.
• If the sequence is iii the optimal decision is i.
Proof. The ﬁr s tp a r ta n dt h el a s tp a r ta r eo b v i o u s ;t h es e c o n di sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tt h es e c o n ds i g n a l
obtained by the manager is always more accurate. We know from proposition 1 that if λ ≤ 2p − 1,i ti s
always optimal to add a signal after ii; thus, if the third signal is j it is optimal to announce decision
j. If λ ≤ λ, we know from proposition 1 that adding a third signal is always worthwhile; i must be
implemented.
This ﬁrst section has dealt with signal technology and has assumed that the acquisition of the third
signal was costless. However, information acquisition here involves an incentive problem on the part of
the manager.
We now turn to the case where the ﬁrm must induce the manager to collect information.
134.2 The ﬁrm incentive problem
In the next subsection, we describe how the presence of the consultant will aﬀect the manager’s incentives.
4.2.1 Advice, learning and incentives
When the ﬁrm designs the incentive scheme, it must take into account the fact that the manager learns
about her own type after the ﬁrst two signals. Learning about her type arises because the manager
compares her own signal to the one reported to her by the consultant.
If the sequence of signal is ii, then using Baye’s rule, the manager’s private assessment of the proba-




> θ.( 6 )
We will refer to this kind of manager as the strong (ability) manager.





We will refer to this kind manager as the weak (ability) manager.
Hence, after she learns the content of the report, the manager has private information about her type,
this private information inﬂuences the amount of eﬀort the manager is willing to devote to information
acquisition.
If there exists a consensus between the manager and the consultant, then the former has little incentive
to acquire more information by expanding eﬀort. The reason is that, since she knows that she already
has a good information about the likely state of nature, obtaining an additional signal will only slightly
improve the quality of her ﬁnal decision. We expect, in this case, that the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it costly to induce
eﬀort from her.
On the other hand, after a dissent, the manager has little information about the likely state of nature.
The contradiction with the consultant informs her that the decision she is about to make is rather loose.
This creates, in turn, incentives on the part of the manager to collect further information about the right
decision. Thus, we can predict that the ﬁrm will obtain a high of eﬀort much more easily in this case.










2 (1 − θ)(1− λ)
.
The denominator of this expression entails the four possible combinations for which two identicals signals can be obtained:
a smart manager and a smart consultant always obtain the same (right) signal; a smart manager can be matched with a
dumb consultant who obtain (by chance) the right signal; the symmetric case and ﬁn a l l yt h ec a s ei nw h i c hb o t ha g e n t sa r e
dumb. The numerator of this expression entails the cases in which the manager is smart.
14Of course, in the no-consultant case, such a learning eﬀect does not exist, and one of the main questions
in the paper is the following: Can the ﬁrm ever beneﬁt from this learning eﬀect in the consultancy case?
The answer is a question of parameter of the model.
4.2.2 The program of the ﬁrm
Compared to the no-consultant case, the proﬁt maximization program of the ﬁrm must now incorporate
the interaction induced by the consultant. The form of the program of the ﬁrm depends on the strength
of the incentives it wants to give to the manager. Indeed, we know that, depending on the nature of
the information transmitted by the consultant, the manager’s incentives to search for information diﬀer.
Thus, three types of contracts can be proposed to the manager to incite her to enhance her decision-
making.
• In the complete search contract (cs) ,t h eﬁrm incites the manager to an informational search
whatever the information he possesses. This is possible only if λ < λ. Indeed, for λ ≥ λ,a
manager who has two identical signals would never want to obtain a third signal, since according
to proposition 1, her ﬁnal decision would be independent of the third signal.
• In the discriminating contract (dc),t h eﬁrm incites the manager to enhance her decision-making
only if she has received two diﬀerent signals. According to proposition 1, this is possible if λ < λ.
• In the no-incentive contract (nic), the manager is never incited to perform an information search,
whatever the nature of the information she holds.
Formally, we denote by PI,iii the joint probability of the events “the realized state of nature is I and
the sequence of signals collected by the manager is three identical signals12 i”. According to corollary 1,
we know that in this case the decision taken by the manager is a success13. Of course, the sequence iii
can be either aaa or bbb and we have PI,iii = PA,aaa+PB,bbb. Moreover, we denote by PI|ii the conditional
probability of success of the manager knowing that her ﬁrst opinion was i and that the advice received
from the consultant was also i.
We now present, successively, the programs of the ﬁrm.
T h eC o m p l e t eS e a r c hC o n t r a c t . In the complete search contract, we denote by wS
cs the salary
obtained by the manager if her decision is a success and if a consultant has been hired. We denote by
12We use small letters for signals and capital letters for states of nature.
13We will not write the decisions that are made by the manager, but we know that these decisions follow the optimal
decision rules given in corollary 1.
15wF
cs the salary in case of failure. The symmetric nature of the signal allows us to simplify the program,





(I,J) ∈ (A,B), (i,j) ∈ (a,b), i 6= j,i fI (resp J)=A then i(resp j)=a




































− 1 ≥ pI|iiwS
cs + pJ|iiwF
cs














− 1 ≥ pI|ijwS
cs + pJ|ijwF
cs














− 1 ≥ pJ|ijwS
cs + pI|ijwF
cs
(Eﬀort of the weak manager when θ < λ)
(10)
wS
cs ≥ 0 and wF
cs ≥ 0 (Limited liability Constraints) (11)
The ﬁrst part of the objective function of the program states that, given the optimal decision rules,
the manager can make the right decision after each of the four possible sequences of signal, namely iii, iij,
iji and ijj.I ns u c hac a s e ,ap o s i t i v eb e n e ﬁt G accrues to the ﬁrm and the manager is paid accordingly.
The second part of the objective function states that the manager can fail to pick the right decision, and
in such a case the ﬁrm shows a loss L, whereas a salary contingent wF
1c is paid to the manager.
The incentive constraint (8) states that the strong manager is induced to obtain an additional signal
rather than to content herself with two signals.
The incentive constraint of the weak manager can take two forms, depending on the compared ex-
pertise of the manager and the consultant. In the right hand side of the constraint (9), if the manager
16decides to shirk (i.e., not to acquire an additional signal) she will follow her own ﬁrst signal rather than
the one reported by the consultant. The reason for this is that the manager has a stronger precision in
the prediction of the state of nature. On the other hand, if the consultant is stronger than her, then
she will use the consultant’s signal to make her decision. The rational manager always follows the signal
reported by the consultant if the latter has a stronger expertise.
In the next lemma, we give the optimal wage scheme that the ﬁrm should oﬀer to the manager to
induce a complete search.





Moreover, for this optimal wage scheme the payoﬀ of the ﬁrm is
Bcs =[ θ + p(1 − θ)]
µ
G + L −
2(1+λθ)
(1 − θ)(2p − 1 − λ)
¶
− L (12)
Proof. One incentive requirement of this problem is wS
cs ≥ wF
cs . The problem of the ﬁrm is to minimize
its wage bill. However, it is constrained by the wealth constraint, which states that wF
cs ≥ 0. Thus the
ﬁrm should optimally set wF∗
cs =0to meet the wealth constraint. The salary wS
cs must be adjusted so
as to meet the three incentive constraints of the manager. Taking into account the fact that we have
wF∗
















for the weak manager and λ < θ.
The ﬁrm wants to set wS
cs as low as possible and it is routine to check that the ﬁrst binding constraint
is (as usual) the incentive constraint of the high type. In expression (12), the probability of success is
[θ + p(1 − θ)] and it is obtained by doing the following reasoning. According to proposition 1, we know
that when λ < λ, the manager follows the third signal. The probability of success is, thus, the probability
of success of the manager of expertise level θ who follow her second signal; that is, with probability θ she
is smart and obtains the right signal whereas with probability 1 − θ, she is dumb and she obtains the
good signal with probability p.
We now give two results that characterize the complete search contract.
17Lemma 3 At the optimum, the complete search contract Bcs is a decreasing function of the consultant’s







Corollary 2 The optimal complete search contract is always dominated by a situation in which the ﬁrm
does not hire any consultant.
Proof. If we make use of expressions (4) and (12), we obtain
∆B = Bnc − Bcs =
2λ(θ + p(1 − θ))(1 + θ(2p − 1))
(1 − θ)(2p − 1)(2p − 1 − λ)
> 0
which is true for any λ < λ.
Some points deserve to be stressed, as these comparative statics results may appear to be counterin-
tuitive. These results have two causes.
First, the information brought by the consultant is not utilized by the manager, and from the point of
view of the ﬁrm is completely useless. Moreover, its eﬀect on the incentive scheme is negative. A manager
who observes two identical signals, privately assess that her level of expertise is b θ =
(1+λ)θ
1+λθ > θ.W h e n
λ rises, her private assessment increases and the marginal productivity of her search eﬀort diminishes,
because the third signal is more likely to be redundant (compared to the ﬁrst two). Thus, giving incentives
becomes more costly to the ﬁrm.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
We are aware that this ﬁrst analysis does not speak in favor of consultancy, as it states that an
increase in the consultant’s expertise for small values of λ strictly lowers the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt (net of the
consultant fees).
The analysis of the two next programs balances this ﬁrst (negative) conclusion and shows that con-
sultancy may beneﬁtt h eﬁrm if the consultant is carefully chosen.
The Discriminating Contract. In this case, the ﬁrm does not incite the manager to deepen his
decision-making if the ﬁrst two signals are identical. As a consequence, in this program the incentive
constraint of the strong manager (8) is removed compared to the complete search case. We denote by
wS
dc the wage given to the manager if the decision is a success and by wF
dc the wage given if the decision



















18subject to constraints (9), (10) and
wS
dck ≥ 0,w F
dck ≥ 0 , k ∈ {1,2} (limited liability). (14)
In the ﬁrm’s objective function, the probability of success is formally written as pI,ii + pI,iji + pJ,ijj
because the strong manager does not ﬁnd it worthwhile to perform an information search. The incentive
constraint of the manager who has received two diﬀerent signals remains the same as the one in the
complete search program. The solution to this program is given below:
Lemma 4 (Optimal incentives with the discriminating contract) . Depending on the compara-
tive level of expertise of the manager and the consultant, there exist two optimal wage scheme solutions
to the program of the ﬁrm:




dc1 =0 . At this optimum, the beneﬁtt ot h eﬁrm is given by:
Bdc1 = 1
4 [1 + 3θ +( 1− θ)(2p + λ)]
³








dc2 =0 . At this optimum, the beneﬁtt ot h eﬁrm is
given by:
Bdc2 = 1
4 [1 + 3θ +( 1− θ)(2p + λ)]
³




Proof. In the proof of lemma 3, a reduced form of the incentive constraints of the weak manager were
already obtained. We know that these constraints are mutually exclusive; that is, if θ ≥ λ, the ﬁrm
should only take into account the corresponding constraint and adjust wS
dc1 so as to make it bind.





When the manager receives two diﬀerent signals, she is induced to obtain a third signal, thus her proba-
bility of success is given by
b = Pi|ij × PI|iji + Pj|ij × PJ|ijj =
θ + p − pθ − λθ
1 − λθ
. (17)
Using expressions (16) and (17), the ex ante probability of success is given by:
PS = Pii × PI|ii + Pij × b = 1
4 [1 + 3θ +( 1− θ)(2p + λ)].





Bdc1 (λ) if λ ≤ θ
Bdc2 (λ) if λ > θ
. (18)
19We must emphasize the results of lemma 4. Let us ﬁrst focus on Bdc (λ), when the manager has greater





(1−θ)(2p−1+λ)2 < 0 .
Thus, increasing the expertise level of the consultant allows the ﬁrm to decrease the salary oﬀered to the
manager. In the discriminating contract, the ﬁrm can lower the agency cost by increasing the reputation
of the consultant. Thus, the consultant’s informativeness and managerial eﬀort in decision-making are
complementary14. Moreover, hiring a consultant has a simple informational eﬀect. Indeed an inspection
of Bdc shows that an increase in the consultant’s expertise increases the probability of a successful
decision; this eﬀect is not present in the complete search contract, where we show that the probability of
good decision is independent of consultant expertise. In the discriminating case, the consultant plays his
expected role and strictly enhances the manager’s decision-making.
The following lemma summarizes these ﬁndings.
Lemma 5 When λ ≤ θ,t h eﬁrm’s beneﬁt when the discriminating contract is implemented is an in-
creasing function of the expertise of the consultant λ.
Proof. ∂Bdc1
∂λ = 1
4 (1 − θ)(G + L)+
8θ2p+(1−θ)(3θ+λ2θ+4θp2−2λθ+4λθp+2)
8(1−θ)(2p−1+λ)2 > 0.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t i c et h a te v e ni ft h ee x p e r t i s e of the consultant is strictly smaller than the
manager’s level of expertise, the probability of success is an increasing function of the consultant’s ex-
pertise. Thus, the manager’s learning process of about her type, described before, allows us to modelize
a fruitful interaction between two heterogenous agents who confront their points of view, and enhance
decision-making with this exchange.





(−2p+2θp−3θ+1+λ+λθ)2 > 0 ,
a n di nt h i sc a s et h ep o s i t i v ei n c e n t i v ee ﬀect of the consultant has disappeared. Now, if the ﬁrm wants to
increase the level of expertise of the consultant, it must also increase the salary oﬀered to the manager
if it still wants to incite her to exert high eﬀort. However, the informational eﬀect remains; that is,
14This incentive eﬀect is not due to the signal technology that assumed in ﬁgure 1. We could develop a variant of this
m o d e li nw h i c ht h es i g n a l sa r ec o n t i n u o u sa n dt h et r u es t a t eo fn a t u r ei sar e a lu n k o w nn u m b e rµ. The manager would receive
a signal drawn from a continuous (e.g. normal) distribution with mean µ but with a variance that would be a function of
her type; a smart manager would obtain a signal from a distribution with precision strictly greater than a dumb one. The
euclidian distance between the signal of the manager and the signal of the consultant would provide some information on
the manager’s type and would aﬀect her incentive for decison-making. In such a variant, the ﬁrm’s problem would be to
determine the distance above which it would incite the manager to search for information.
20increasing the consultant’s expertise increases the probability of a right decision. Hence, when λ > θ,
increasing λ has an ambiguous eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
According to proposition 1, we know that it is not possible to induce an information search when
λ > λ =
2p−1+3θ−2pθ
1+θ > θ.I fw ec o n s i d e rwS ∗
dc2 it is obvious that when λ approaches λ this salary becomes
inﬁnite and the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt will eventually become (inﬁnitely) negative. Thus, starting from a level
λ = λ, slightly decreasing λ would increase the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt. However, when λ = θ, decreasing λ is
never proﬁtable, according to the previous lemma. What we just said suggests the following result:
Proposition 2 (Optimal informativeness of advice) . If one denotes by Bdc the optimal beneﬁt
curve in the discriminating contract, then there exists a unique level of consultant expertise λ∗ such that
the ﬁrm beneﬁti sm a x i m i z e d .λ∗ is strictly greater than θ and it is given explicitly by






Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
This result, about the optimality of the team formed by the manager and the consultant, is that
given the managerial’s prior expertise and the fact that the ﬁrm wants her to participate in the decision
process, the level of expertise of the consultant chosen to advise the manager should be equal to λ∗15.
The optimal level of informativeness of the consultant is shown to be strictly greater than the level of the
manager. This level λ∗ trades oﬀ the need for incentives provision and the informativeness of the advice.
When G + L (a rough measure of the variance) increases, the optimal value λ∗ increases and get closer
from λ; that is accepting project at the ﬁrst round (i.e., after a sequence ii) becomes more costly and
the ﬁrm is ready to pay higher salaries to the manager. Indeed when λ∗ is increased, the manager is less
prone to search for new information and is willing to content herself with the information delivered by
the consultant. The exact relationship between the level of eﬀort of the manager and the informativeness
of the consultant is derived in the last section where we introduce continuous level of eﬀo r t( s e el e m m a
8).
15In an old version of this paper (Marcoul (1999)), we investigate the robustness of the conclusions reached in the case
of symmetric payoﬀs in each state of nature in a situation in which the manager can either implement a risky decision for
the ﬁrm or implement the status quo that has no ﬁnancial consequence for the ﬁrm. We show that the optimal incentive
scheme is identical to the one derived by Snyder and Levitt (1997). Indeed, when the manager receives “bad news” about
the decision, the ﬁrm would like her to stop the implementation, and provides her with incentives to report the bad news. It
turns out that the properties about the value of advice derived in the case of symmetric state of nature payoﬀsr e m a i nt r u e
when states of nature no longer have symmetric payoﬀs. In particular, the shape of the curve is preserved. These results
are available upon request.
21It is important to note that the consultant that would be chosen by the ﬁrm is not the one that the
manager would pick. Indeed if we denote the manager’s (equilibrium) utility by U∗




When λ ≥ θ, the derivative of U∗







The manager would thus choose a stronger consultant than the one the ﬁrm would like to give him.
Interestingly, the manager would not choose a consultant whose level is greater than λ because in this
case decision-making is completely externalized and the manager plays no role in it and he would loose
any rent associated with information gathering. The feature of the model may help us to understand
why some corporations have set up a severe control on consultant’s choice and expenses16. Without
anticipating the results of proposition 4, the manager would like to choose the consultant in the set Υ.
This set is one in which an increase in the advisor’s expertise leads to a lower proﬁtf o rt h eﬁrm.
Figure 3 represents the beneﬁtc u r v eo ft h eﬁrm as a function of λ in the discriminating case. Bdc is
a continuous curve because Bdc1 (.) and Bdc2 (.) do cross for λ = θ. The curve is not deﬁned for values
of λ that are greater than λ, this is the result of proposition 1. We denote by Bnc t h ec a s ew h e r en o
consultant is hired, ﬁgure 3 shows clearly that for some values of λ (including λ∗)t h eﬁrm should hire
a consultant. This result may be surprising because the ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to increase the
consultant’s expertise after the level λ∗.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
The no-incentive contract. We now proceed to the analysis of the last case. This case is more simple
than the previous ones, since neither kind of manager is induced to collect a third signal17. The manager
must then be given, in any state of nature, her reservation wage normalized to 0. When θ < λ, the
manager just transmits the signal reported to her by the consultant. Otherwise when θ ≥ λ, the manager
just transmits her own signal, as it is stronger than the consultant’s. Therefore, the beneﬁtc u r v eo ft h e







2 (1 − λ)
¢
G − 1
2 (1 − λ)L if θ < λ
¡
θ + 1
2 (1 − θ)
¢
G − 1
2 (1 − θ)L if θ ≥ λ
.
16The reader can refer to the book of O’Shea and Madigan (1997) to ﬁnd striking examples of consultant’s overuse by
managers (and the response of the corporation).
17This case would be equivalent to the case in which the manager is totally ignorant.
22In ﬁgure 4, we have represented the beneﬁt function of the ﬁrm in the case where the manager is not
induced to obtain a third signal. Therefore, with two signals the manager follows her own signal when
her ability is stronger than the consultant’s (i.e., θ ≥ λ) and the consultant piece of advice otherwise.
Thus, the beneﬁt curve depends on λ only for θ < λ.
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
4.3 Optimality of the consultant
After the analysis of the diﬀerent programs of the ﬁrm, we now look for the properties of the beneﬁt
function. We want to determine the optimal level of the consultant’s expertise, knowing that the con-
sultant has an impact on the manager’s incentives. We restrain the analysis to the cases in which the
manager is induced to exert a positive eﬀort ex ante.
Proposition 3 In the consultancy framework, when the ﬁrm wants the manager to participate in decision-
making (i.e., search for information with a positive probability), the optimal consultant has always a level
of expertise equal to λ∗.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
The case where the consultant has an ability equal to 0 has a straightforward interpretation, because
such a consultant reports a perfectly random signal independent of the real state of nature. This signal
is not taken into account by the manager; this case is perfectly equivalent to a situation in which there
is no consultant. The proof shows that the beneﬁt derived in (4) is always strictly smaller than the
beneﬁt derived with λ∗ whenever the condition in lemma 1 is satisﬁed. There is thus room for a positive
consulting fee18. Therefore, given that the manager brings in her knowledge into the decision-making
process, there exists a unique level of “external information” that maximizes the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt. This
level of external information takes into account the incentive scheme of the manager. The next result
presents a simple condition under which (free) advice will decrease the ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
Proposition 4 (Negative value of increased infomativeness of advice) In the consultancy frame-
w o r k ,i ft h ef o l l o w i n gs u ﬃcient condition is realized:
c = G + L>c,
then for λ = λ∗,t h eﬁrm derives strictly more proﬁt when it induces the manager to exert eﬀort than
when the consultant makes the decision alone. Moreover, there exists a non-empty set of the consultants’
18It is straightforward to assume that the fee is an increasing function of the level of λ (with possibly inﬁnite fees when
it becomes perfect, i.e. λ =1 ). It would still give a unique level 0 ≤ λ
∗ < 1 such that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is maximized.
23informativeness Υ =] λ∗,λsup[ such that every consultant picked in Υ will bring a strictly lower proﬁtt o





This result completes the picture described in proposition 3. For projects with a magnitude c greater
than c,w h e nλ = λ∗,t h eﬁrm prefers to involve the manager into the decision-making process rather
than to let the consultant decide alone. Interestingly, increasing the informativeness of the consultant
above λ∗ will strictly decrease the ﬁrm’s proﬁt whenever c = G + L>c. Thus, the decision-making
process can be made strictly less eﬃcient with stronger advice. Having the consultant decide alone is
only worthwhile if his level is increased above λsup.
It seems worth noticing that the set Υ belongs to the set of consultant that are more informative
than the manager ex ante (because λ∗ > θ). It emphasizes the potential harm of choosing a consultant
level of informativeness that does not ﬁt well with the manager eﬀort, and talent. We believe that this
result sheds light on why it is practically a problem to manage “external information” and managerial
incentives19.
After the analysis of each of the ﬁrm’s programs , we wonder what is the exact shape of the beneﬁt
curve of the ﬁrm as a function of the consultant ability λ. This curve which we denote Bc is deﬁned by
Bc =s u p( Bcs,B dc,B nic).
Figure 6 represents Bc in the case where hiring a consultant is proﬁtable; that is, hiring a consultant
whose ability is near λ∗ generates a greater gross beneﬁt than without a consultant. To know whether
a consultant actually will be hired one must take into account the compensation that is given to the
consultant. This question depends on the consultancy market conditions, and is out of the scope of this
paper.
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
We now develop a variant of this model in which we introduce some correlation between the signals
obtained by weak agents. We analyze the consequences for the discriminatory contract.
4.4 Correlated signals: Is “external information” superior ?
Up until now, we have described a situation in which the signals received by the consultant and the
manager are either perfectly correlated - when agents are both smart, they both receive the right signal -
19The recent managerial literature tends to emphasize the client’s involvment in the mission. On the client role, see for
instance Hislop (2002).
24or completely independent - when at least one of the agent is mediocre, the signals received are completely
independent. This last assumption may be restrictive.
Indeed, in most organizations the necessity to rationalize production processes leads to a standard-
ization of the practices used for dealing with problems. For instance, when time is of essence, common
language between employees helps the organization to react more rapidly to a change in the competitive
environment. This common way of thinking is often referred to as corporate culture by social scientists,
and the economic aspects of corporate culture have been studied by several economists20.M o s t o f t h e
time, corporate culture must lead to a common way of analyzing problems within an organization; em-
ployees analyze the problem in the same manner simply because they are used to doing so21.A sar e s u l t
t h es o l u t i o nt h a ta r ea d o p t e dt e n dt ob es i m i l a ra n dm i s t a k e sa l s ot e n dt ob ec o r r e l a t e d .
The purpose of this section is to address the importance of correlated mistakes in the decision-making
process of the manager. To modelize correlation, we make the following assumption.
Assumption: When the manager and the consultant are both mediocre, the signals that they receive





Since we know that the complete search contract is dominated by hiring a consultant of level λ∗,
we focus on the discriminatory contract. The objective function of the ﬁrm is identical to (13). The
constraints are (9), (10) and the limited liability constraints. Using, the probabilities of success (when
µ ≥ 1












dc2 =0if λ > θ.
The probability of success can be computed as
PS = 1
2 (1 − θ)((2p + λ)(1− µ)+2 µλp + µ − λp)+θ.
If θ ≥ λ, the beneﬁto ft h eﬁrm is given by
20Crémer (1993) emphasizes the fact that organizations do develop among their employees a shared knowledge of the
norms of behavior. For a survey of the literature on the economics of corporate culture, see Hermalin (2000).
21The economic literature on strategic communication has emphasized the prevalence of herding in communications made
by experts. Here, the fact that people have the same point of view is just the result of their standardized way of thinking (the
consultant may not observe the manager’s opinion, for instance). In the conclusion, we discuss for possibility of strategic


















The next result analyze the eﬀect of changes in µ on the equilibrium proﬁt.
Proposition 5 (Beneﬁt from less correlation in mistakes) When λ ≥ θ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h em i s -
take correlation factor µ always leads to a smaller beneﬁt in the discriminating contract if λ ∈ [θ,λ0] and












Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
This result is due to the nature of the discriminating contract. When µ is very high, dumb decision-
makers tend to share the same point of view and a lot of wrong decisions are made. Basically, a decrease
in µ leads to an increase in the probability of dissent between the manager and the consultant. Those
decisions are worth being reevaluated by the manager.
The economic literature on experts relies essentially on a one-shot transmission of information, in
which the value of advice is summarized by the ability of the expert; namely, his expertise.
This result is interesting because it introduces, besides pure expertise (i.e., the probability of being
right when advising), another component of what makes advice valuable. Indeed, the consultant is
valuable not only because of his level of expertise, θ, but also because of the way he is mistaken.
If we accept the fact that mistakes tend to be more correlated within than across organizations, then
for equal ability, an “external consultant” is expected to be of greater value for the ﬁrm than an internal
one22. The external consultant has more value because his confrontation with the manager generates
more incentives on the part of the manager; the ﬁrm can then use the consultant as an incentive device.
We see that, to the extend to which hiring an external consultant is observable by a third party (e.g.,
an investor), the ﬁrm may use this action to credibly commit to devoting more emphasis (than usual) on
a given project. This result can help us to understand why, to some extent, external consulting works
because the ﬁrm can always replicate the advisory process internally.
22For instance, we could assume that an internal consultant has µi, whereas an external one is characterized by µext with
µi >µ ext.
265 Continuous eﬀort levels
We now develop a version of the present model with continuous eﬀort levels. The aim of this section
is to test the robustness of some of the results found previously. In particular, the fact that the value
of information may strictly decrease when the advice is more accurate seems more questionable with
continuous eﬀort levels. We found, however, that it is still true with continuous eﬀort levels. Moreover,
allowing for continuous eﬀort makes it possible to describe how the manager’s incentives should be
adjusted when the informativeness of the advice is changed.
5.1 The model with continuous eﬀort levels
We assume that the model remains the same up to the point where the manager has to perform eﬀort to
obtain a third signal. To modelize continuous eﬀort, we slightly modify the information research of the
manager.
Let p ∈ (0,1) be the probability that the manager obtains the right signal. We assume that with the
complementary probability, she obtains a signal identical to her ﬁrst signal she had. This assumption
implies that with any strictly positive level of eﬀort, the manager is able to generate a new signal (or
new opinion) that “beats” her original signal.
The manager can generate p only by expanding eﬀort. Let C (p) represent the monetary cost supported
by the manager if she wants to generate p. We assume that this cost function veriﬁes the following usual
properties:
Assumption 1: C (.) is positive and its ﬁrst two derivatives are positive. Moreover, it veriﬁes C (0) = 0,
C (1) = +∞, C0 (0) = 0 and C0 (1) = +∞.
This set of conditions is imposed to guarantee an interior solution to the problem of the choice of
eﬀort level of the manager.
Although eﬀort is a continuous variable, the question remains whether the manager should acquire a
third signal. From corollary 2, we know that inducing her to obtain a signal when she already possesses
two identical signals is not optimal for the ﬁrm. Thus, we concentrate only on the discriminating contract;




contingent upon the outcome.















1 − PS/ij,e p
¢





wF − C (p) ≥ PS/ijwS + PF/ijwF (IA1)
wS ≥ 0 and wF ≥ 0 (LL)
The incentive constraint (IC1) ensures that it is optimal for a manager to choose e p = p voluntarily.
The information acquisition constraint (IA1) states that the decision-maker must be induced to search for
information when she has been contradicted by the consultant. The quality of the third signal acquired
by the decision-maker makes her better-oﬀ than if she was to use her prior opinion and the information
provided by the consultant only. As before, two cases should be considered, depending on the relative
strength of the consultant and the manager.
If θ ≤ λ, then when only two signals are used, the probability of success is the probability that the





it is an increasing function of the consultant’s ability and a decreasing function of the manager’s ability.
Conversely, if θ > λ then when only two signals are used, the probability of success is the probability
that the right decision is the one defended by the manager. PS/ij (or equivalently PI/ij) can be written
as
PS/ij =
(1 + θ)(1− λ)
2(1− θλ)
, (19)
a decreasing function of the consultant’s ability and an increasing function of the manager’s ability.
PS/ij,p is the probability of right decision when the manager follows her own signal after exerting an
eﬀort p. Some computations give an analytical expression of PS/ij,p. We obtain:
PS/ij,p =
(1 + θ)(1− λ)+( 1− θ)(1+λ)p
2(1− θλ)
. (20)
This expression is identical to (19) when p =0 .
We know that any solution to the principal’s problem must be such that23 wS∗ >w F∗ =0 . Given the
assumptions made about the cost of eﬀort, the decision-maker’s payoﬀ is strictly concave in p. Her eﬀort









23This assertion will not be proven in the paper, since this is a standard result of contract theory. However, a proof is
available upon request.




(p) if it wants to obtain a level of eﬀort p
from a manager who has received a diﬀerent signal from the consultant. By placing (IC
0
1)i n t o( IA1),
we obtain the modiﬁed information acquisition constraint in the two cases. For θ ≤ λ,w eo b t a i n




(p) ≥ C (p),( IA
0
1)
whereas for θ ≥ λ,w eh a v e
pC
0
(p) ≥ C (p). (IA
0
2)
We notice that (IA
0
2) is never binding, since C (0) = 0 and C
00
(.) > 0. The intuition behind this is: a
manager exerting an arbitrarily small eﬀort would always ﬁnd it optimal to use the new signal generated
by this eﬀort. Indeed, this signal would strictly dominate her own prior signal. When λ > θ,t h i si s
no longer true, since the strength of the new signal acquired by the manager should be compared to
the one brought by the consultant. Thus, a minimal eﬀort is required of the manager if she wants to
“outperform” the consultant’s signal.
Using (IA
0
1) and computing Ps,w ec a nr e w r i t et h es i m p l i ﬁed program Ω
0




4 (2(1 + θ)+( 1− θ)(1+λ)p)
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(p) ≥ C (p). (IA
0
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The assumption made above guarantees that the ﬁrm’s optimization problem is globally concave and




Lemma 6 When λ ≥ θ there exists a unique a level of consultant’s ability λb such that the information
acquisition constraint (IA
0
1)b i n d sw h e nλ ≥ λb a n dm a yn o tb i n dw h e nλ < λb.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
The next proposition gives a solution to the simpliﬁed program Ω
0
for all possible values of θ and λ.
24Note that the assumption is implied by C
000
(p) ≥ 0.
29Proposition 6 (Optimal incentives with continuous eﬀort) In the case θ > λ, the unique optimal
contract solving Ω
0
implements popt = p∗. This level of eﬀort p∗ is characterized by















In the case θ < λb ≤ λ, the unique optimal contract solving Ω
0






In the case θ ≤ λ < λb < 1, the optimal contract solving Ω
0
implements popt =m a x{p∗,p}. The optimal




(popt) and wF∗ =0 .
Proof. The proof is immediate. When the acquisition constraint is not binding, the ﬁrst order condition
of (Ω
0
) gives (21). Assumption 2 makes (21) suﬃcient. When the acquisition constraint is binding for
sure, (22) gives the eﬀort level p. When the acquisition constraint may be binding, the optimal will be
given by the maximum of these two levels, since we want eﬀort to be exerted.
Corollary 3 The equilibrium proﬁt function generated by the optimal contract characterized above admits
a unique, optimal level λ∗ of consultant informativeness.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
This corollary extends the result of the two-eﬀort-case. For any decision-maker who must be given
incentives to search for information, there exists an optimal level of informativeness of the advice she can
receive.
A way to interpret this result is that the consultant will achieve two goals: ﬁrst, he will bring some
information to the decision-making process, and second, he will enhance the incentives for decision-making
of the manager when needed. The ﬁr s to b j e c t i v ew i l lb ef u l ﬁlled with a very strong consultant. However,
to fulﬁll the second, only a consultant with talent comparable to the manager’s should be hired. The
optimal level λ∗ balances these two objectives.
This result is somewhat general and continues to hold in the case of n signals. One important
question about the discriminating contract concerns its optimality and, more particularly, whether it can
dominate,for any λ, the case in which the manager performs the information search and decision-making
alone.
It can be shown that this will be the case for any (θ,λ) ∈ [0,1]
2 when the number of states of nature
(and possible decisions) becomes great. The intuition behind this result is straightforward: when n is
great, the probability that the manager and the consultant obtain the same signal when at least one
30of them is not talented is low. This is because an untalented agent has the probability 1
n to obtain a
signal identical to the one obtained by a talented one. Thus, the probability of a wrong decision with
two identical signals becomes small as n increases, and the discriminating contract tends to perfectly sort
decisions that have to be rethought and decisions that do not.
Once the consultant has been hired, the question remains whether he should be utilized alone or if
the manager should be induced to make some eﬀort after information has been exchanged. Of course,
since giving incentives is costly, any consultant close to λ =1should be used alone. However, we can
show the following result:
Proposition 7 There always exists a non-empty set of a consultant’s levels of informativeness, strictly
greater than the manager’s talent θ, such that the discriminating contract strictly dominates the case in
which the manager is not involved in decision-making.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
This result states that even a consultant strictly stronger than the manager should not be left alone;
the manager, when contradicted, should be given incentives to build on that contradiction and exerts
eﬀorts toward decision-making. This result shows formally the necessary involvement of the manager in
the consultant’s mission; this involvement has been emphasized very much in the business literature25.
The next result clariﬁes the relationship between the eﬀort exerted by the manager and the consultant’s
informativeness.
Lemma 7 (Informativeness and managerial eﬀort level) The optimal level of eﬀort popt =m a x{p∗,p}
increases whenever the informativeness of the consultant λ is increased.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Again, this lemma shows that the eﬀort of the manager and the consultant’s informativeness should
not be decided separately. As emphasized in the business literature, if the consultant delivers more
informative signals, the manager should be even more involved in the decision-making process in case
of dissent. Loose intuitions suggest that the information delivered by the consultant and the manager’s
eﬀort are substitute; that is, the stronger the signal of the consultant is, the smaller should be the
manager’s eﬀort.
The conclusion of our model turns out to be more subtle. Either the eﬀort exerted by the manager
should be 0 in the case of consent, or in the case of dissent, the manager should be prepared to deliver
25It is interesting to note that once you allow for strictly positive consulting fees, F (.), increasing in λ and for F (λ) being
high when λ =1 , then, our simulations show that the optimal contract is one in which the manager is involved.
31a “high performance” in term of the accurateness of the signal she obtains. Managerial eﬀort and the
consultant’s informativeness are complementary in the latter case. The next paragraph makes the results
obtained in this section more palatable.
5.2 An example of decreasing value of information
The aim of this paragraph is to develop a numerical example to show that the conclusions reached in the
two-eﬀort-levels case will still hold when the eﬀort of the manager is treated as a continuous variable.
Indeed, failing to coordinate the two agents will result in a loss of proﬁt if the consultant brings a more
informative signal.
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It is easy to show that
∂p
∂λ is strictly positive; an increase in the advice informativeness should be followed
by an increase in managerial eﬀort. Figure 1 illustrates all the results we established in the continuous
eﬀort version of the model. The beneﬁtt ot h eﬁrm when it uses a consultant corresponds to the plain
line curve and is denoted Bc.
We have represented the level λ∗,t h ev a l u eo fλ∗ (' 0.889) depends on the initial talent of the manager
θ (= 0.6), the beneﬁt in case of success and failure (G = L = 200), and the cost function described above.
The set Υ is shown to exist in this example; that is, for any value of λ lying between Υ ' [0.889,0.92],
the beneﬁt from advice will be strictly lower for the ﬁrm. However, we can also exhibit cost function for
which Υ will be an empty set26.
A consultant can be used alone with no involvement on the part of the manager. In this case, the
proﬁto ft h eﬁrm is a straight increasing line. The form of the proﬁt as a function of λ can be explained
26There are cases in which, the beneﬁt curve is always increasing. However, all of our simulations show that there is a





















Figure 1: The value of advice when eﬀort is a continuous variable.
as follows. Starting from λ = θ, an increase in the value of λ always increases the beneﬁtt ot h eﬁrm.
At some point for λ = λb, the information acquisition constraint becomes binding and popt is determined
according to (23). For λ > λb, further increases in the value of λ are possible only if the value of popt = p is
increased even more. For high values of λ, it becomes very expensive to reward the manager for gathering
information, and the proﬁt associated with the discriminating contract becomes smaller than the proﬁt
to the ﬁrm with no involvement27.
It should be pointed out that managerial involvement in the discriminating contract is only partial.
For instance, in the example where the hired consultant has level λ∗ ' 0.889, the probability that a
manager of initial talent θ =0 .6 must exert eﬀort is 0.23 (i.e. 1−θλ∗
2 ).
This example illustrates the fact that, even if the ﬁrm optimizes the manager’s eﬀort, the beneﬁt
curve can still be shown to be decreasing in λ. This result is not an artifact of the binary eﬀort model.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have analyzed the relationship between a consultant and his client. We assumed that a
manager’s opinion about a given problem could be, at some private cost, enhanced. We ﬁrst studied the
simple case in which a ﬁrm wants to induce such an improvement decision-making. We then introduce an
external source of information for the manager. In this setting, the analysis shows that the presence of a
consultant generates several contradictory eﬀects on a manager’s incentives, and these eﬀects’s direction
27This is not very surprising since we have assumed away consulting fees. A perfect decision-maker (λ =1 )i st r i v i a l l y
dominant in our setting. This would certainly not be true if the fees for the perfect adviser were high enough.
33is, ap r i o r i , ambiguous. As shown by the analysis of beneﬁt curve, an increase in the ability of the
consultant is not always followed by an increase of the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt. Thus, when the manager has,
ex ante, a positive probability of exerting eﬀort, we characterize an optimal level of the consultant’s
expertise. We characterize the form of the beneﬁt curve when the manager is an active information
searcher.
We believe that the assumption made to generate the incentive eﬀect of consultancy is not a narrow
one, and that in most of real situations, the manager has the (costly) opportunity to obtain more
information. Hence, a consequence is that the beneﬁt of consultancy should not be assessed only on
the value of the information transmitted by the consultant but also on the incentives eﬀe c ti th a so nt h e
part of the manager.
However, from a practical viewpoint, the value of a consultant’s intervention remains diﬃcult to
measure. The recent management literature does indeed focus largely on the relationship between the
consultant and his client, and argues that caring about client involvement during the mission is a key
aspect for valuing advice.
An interesting by-product of the paper is that it gives a “visual” representation of the value of the
consultant for the ﬁrm. Figure 5 shows that, the value of advice is a rather convex function of its
informativeness. In a model in which the decision-maker is ignorant (thus, without any interaction with
the client) the curve would be linearly increasing with λ. In our setting, the payoﬀ for high reputation
(above λ) seems to be high compared to those arising from an average reputation. This helps us to
understand why, it is (overly) important for consultants to build a high reputation.
In order to simplify the analysis, we have made the assumption that the external source of information
is an exogenous parameter. The goal was to study the eﬀect of external information on the manager’s
incentives, we therefore treated the consultant as an honest communicator. However, the fact that the
value of information can be negative suggests that if we allow the consultant to have more degrees of
freedom in his communication, he may indeed behave strategically.
Consultants usually try to extract managerial resources by distorting their communication. For
instance, in our setting, any proﬁt maximizing consultant, with a level of expertise belonging to Υ,w o u l d
like to transmit less information to the manager and stick to a level λ∗ of expertise. Interestingly here,
the consultant would diminish the quality of the information transmitted to the decision-maker and,
nevertheless increase the ﬁrm’s proﬁt28!
28There remains the question of how the consultant credibly lowers the quality of the information transmitted. However,
this ﬁndings is reminiscent of Ottaviani and Sorensen’s (1999) result but arises for diﬀerent reasons; the consultant wants
to “extract” eﬀort from the manager.
34It should be interesting also to investigate the case in which two agents (or more) devote eﬀorts to
making a decision, and exchange information. Our model suggests that agents will have to decide how
much information to communicate under two countervailing forces. When they communicate, the two
agents will have to balance the need to generate incentives for information searches and the need to
be informative enough to help the other side reach a satisfactory opinion. We believe that the design
of committee with endogenous information is an important topic. This design should entail how the
compensation of the members will induce them to interact fruitfully29. Moreover, the problems studied
by those committee often relate to several areas of expertise30, there is also a need to study the interaction
of experts within such committees. We hope that the study of endogenous incentives for decision-making
created by the relationship between the manager and the consultant is a step in that direction.
29There exist contributions that study how committee members are induced to search information through diﬀerent voting
mechanisms. See, for instance Persico (1999) and Bose (2001).
30For instance, the evaluation of risks is made by several types of specialists. The relevant decisions concerning a risk
of volcano erruption (e.g., the need for population evacuation) would be made with the help of a volcanologist, a security
specialist, and perhaps a psychologist (to determine the best way to communicate those decisions to the population).
357A p p e n d i x
The next table presents each possible probability that is used in the optimization program of the ﬁrm.
Because the states of nature are equally likely, we can restrict to signal i as the ﬁrst signal received by
the manager. For instance, in the ﬁrst row we compute the ex ante unconditional probability of receiving
signal sequence ii.I fa ne ﬀort is performed, then the probability that a signal j occurs, given that ii has
been received. is in turn given. To ﬁnish, given the three signal sequence, we compute the probability
of success if the manager picks a given decision. The probabilities of failure are easily found, as the
probability of success of an event is one minus the probability of failure.












The numerator presents all the events in which sequence iij can arise. To obtain a signal j whereas
she previously obtained i, the manager must be dumb with probability one; therefore, this happens with
probability 1 − θ. Then, either she faces a smart consultant (i.e., who always gets the right signal) and
she is unlucky and gets the opposite signal with probability 1 − p; or she faces a dumb consultant. The
latter is then lucky with probability 1
2 (1 − λ), and the manager is unlucky and contradicts him with
probability (1 − p). The consultant is now unlucky again with probability 1
2 (1 − λ) and the manager is
lucky with probability p.
The denominator presents all the events in which sequence ii arises. The manager and the consultant
are both smart and receive the same signal; this arises with probability λθ. The consultant is smart and
faces a lucky manager, the reverse holds. A dumb consultant faces a dumb manager who receives, by
chance, the same signal he does. All these events do arise for sequence “aa” and sequence “bb”. Using the
same Bayesian logic, one can compute all the conditional probabilities of the game. Those probabilities
are inserted in ﬁgure 2.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 . We ﬁrst show that whenever λ < λ , obtaining a third signal is always
worthwhile for the ﬁrm.
Let us suppose that two identical signals have been obtained, and denote these signals by ii.I t i s
worth adding a signal to the previous two only if doing so can change the ﬁnal (optimal) decision. One
would only want to change the decision if the third signal contradicts the previous two; that is, if the
manager obtains signal j.
If the sequence is iij, the manager knows that she is dumb. Therefore, the probability that her signal
is correct is p, whereas the probability that the correct signal is i is λ+ 1
2 (1 − λ). The best decision is j
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Figure 2: Relevant events and their probability of occurence.
if p>1
2 (1 + λ) that is if λ < λ =2 p − 1.
The other case is the one in which the ﬁrst signals are ij. In this case the optimal decision is looser
than the one taken in the ii case. The opportunity of adding a third signal to ij is, thus, obvious.
We now turn to the case in which obtaining two signals is suﬃcient. Assume again that ij has been
received and that the consultant has a stronger expertise than the manager. Then the optimal decision
with two signals is to pick decision j. In such a case, it is useless to obtain an additional signal if it does
not change the optimal decision with respect to the two-signals case. A third signal can be j.T h u s ,t h e
optimal decision is still j, and obviously the third signal does not alter the decision with respect to the
two-signals’ case.
A third signal can be i, and in such a case the manager has received two identical signals ii.T h e






















The left hand side of the inequality states that after the sequence iji a success can be obtained either
by a smart manager and a dumb consultant who contradicts him by chance, or by a dumb manager who
obtains two identical signals and is contradicted by a dumb consultant.
37The right hand side states that after a sequence iji a success can be obtained if a dumb manager who
obtains two identical (wrong) signals faces a consultant who reports the right signal. This inequality is
equivalent to λ > λ =
2p−1+3θ−2pθ
1+θ . When the manager has more expertise, it is obvious that a third
signal is optimal. But, this does not contradict the conclusion reached before, as inequality λ > θ > λ
holds in this case.
We now turn to the case of intermediate values of λ.If the ﬁrst signals are ij, one knows from the
previous explanation that if λ ≤ λ, obtaining a third signal is strictly optimal. Moreover, from the ﬁrst
case we know that there is no point in adding a signal if the sequence is ii and λ ≥ λ.
Proof of proposition 2. We have
∂Bdc2
∂λ = 1
4 (1 − θ)c −
(1−θ)(9θ2+λ2θ2−6λθ2+4λθ2p−12θ2p+4θ2p2−4λθp+2λθ−4θp2+9θ+λ2θ+4p)
2(2θp−2p−3θ+1+λ+λθ)2
where c = G + L.
The local maximum must verify the following ﬁrst-order condition ∂B3c
∂λ =0 .W ek n o wt h a tλ,i fi t














which is true because λ < λ =
2p(1−θ)+3θ−1
1+θ . Hence, we have a local maximum of Bdc2 for λ∗.T os h o w
that λ∗ > θ, we compute the diﬀerence between those two terms. It can be easily shown that it is equal
to











The previous expression is positive if the numerator N is positive.







Thus, the minimum of N is obtained for the smallest value of c equal to c =
4(p+θ−pθ)
(1−θ)2(2p−1)2 according to






where A =4 θ(1 − p)
¡





+4θ2p2. Hence λ∗ > θ.A sw eh a v eBdc1 (θ)=
Bdc2 (θ) and ∂Bdc1
∂λ > 0, λ∗ is a maximum of Bdc1,a n dBdc2 for 0 ≤ λ < λ .





function Bcs is deﬁned over the interval [0,λ] and it is strictly decreasing on this interval, its maximum
is for λ =0 . Thus, when a consultant is hired if Bdc (λ∗) >B cs (0) then we have λopt = λ∗.
We compute the diﬀerence between Bdc (λ∗) and Bcs (0)(= Bnc). Using (5) and (15), we can write
this diﬀerence as
∆B = Bdc (λ∗) − Bcs (0) = ∆p.c +
¡
(θ + p(1 − θ))wS∗
nc − 1
4 (1 + 3θ +( 1− θ)(2p + λ∗))wS∗
dc2
¢
We show successively that two terms of this equation are positive. The ﬁrst term is the diﬀerence between
the probabilities of success, it is
∆p.c = 1
4 (1 − θ)(1+λ∗ − 2p)c.
After replacing λ∗ by its value (see proposition 2), we ﬁnd that
∆p.c = 1




























when λ = λ∗ and estimated at c = c,a n dw h e r eA =
p
((1 + 3θ − 2θp)(2θ + p − θp)) and
B =
q¡
8θp +8 θ2 − 20θ2p − 8θp2 +2 θ +1 6 θ2p2 − 8θ3p2 +8 θ3p − 2θ3 +4 p
¢
.





It is thus strictly smaller than 2
√







It is thus strictly greater than 2p. We thus have a major value for the second term, u2, of ∆w.I ti s
U2 = (4θp2−8θ2p2+4θ3p2−4θ3p+9θ2p−4θp−p+θ3−3θ2)
(1+θ)2(2p−1)p >u 2 .
39We can show that the ﬁrst term of ∆w, u1, is strictly greater than U2.W eﬁnd that






8(1+θ)2(2p−1)(1−θ)p + θ2 θ2p3−θ4p3+1+θ6p4−θ2p
2(1+θ)2(2p−1)(1−θ)p > 0
∆w is positive for c = c. To complete the proof, we now have to show that ∂∆B





























> 0 if c ≥ c.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4 . We compute the diﬀerence between Bdc2 and Bnic. ∆B, computed for
λ = λ∗ must be positive. The function ∆B is easily computed:
∆B = Bdc2 − Bnic = 1











This expression is positive if the numerator is positive. Thus, there exists a level c such that any c strictly
greater will make ∆B (λ = λ∗) strictly positive. This is a suﬃcient condition, in many case c>c is not
required to obtain ∆B>0.
If Bdc2 (λ∗) > 1
2 (1 + λ∗)(B + L), then providing incentives to the manager to search for information
while advised by a consultant of reputation λ∗ is strictly worth. The inequality will still hold for any
consultant with reputation λ∗+ε where ε is arbitrarily small but positive. But, we know from proposition
2t h a tλ∗ is the unique maximum of Bdc (.).T h u sf o rλ∗ + ε the discriminating contract still dominates
the no eﬀort contract (by continuity) but it yields a strictly lower proﬁtt ot h eﬁrm. If λ is increased
signiﬁcantly, the beneﬁt of the no eﬀort contract will increased to the point where it is equal to Bdc2 (λ∗).
Proof of proposition 5. When µ>1
2, the upper bound on the consultant’s level is
λ(µ)=
2θ +2 p − 2pθ − 1 − 2µp +2 µpθ + µ − µθ






(θ−µθ−2µp+2µpθ+µ+p−pθ)2 < 0. λ(µ) is minimum for µ = 1
2 (independent signals).
It is routine to show that θ < λ0 = θ
3−2p





















is negative as long as λ ≤ λ0 = θ
3−2p
1+2θ−2pθ.T h e r e f o r e , i f c ≥ c0, ∂B
∂µ is negative. If λ > λ0 then ∂B
∂µ is
negative.
P r o o fo fl e m m a7 .When λ = θ,t h eﬁrst order condition of the relaxed problem can be written as












L e tu sd e n o t eb yp(θ) the level of eﬀort that solves (25). When λ =1 ,t h eﬁrst order condition can be
written as













Considering the two conditions and the convexity of the cost function, we must have 1 >p(1) >p(θ) > 0.
The constraint (IA
0
1) reduces to pC
0
(p) ≥ C (p) when λ = θ. Thus, any p ∈ (0,1) would satisfy the
constraint. In particular, for p = p(θ), the constraint would be slack. When λ → 1, the constraint (IA
0
1)
will continue to hold only if the denominator remains positive. The denominator remains positive only
if p also tends toward 1. The existence of λb follows.
P r o o fo fc o r o l l a r y3 . The ﬁrst step consists of showing that the objective function of the max-
imization program Ω
0
is an increasing function of λ when the information acquisition constraint is not
binding.
When θ ≥ λ, we know that the information acquisition constraint does not bind since (IA
0
2)h o l d s .











The proﬁto ft h eﬁrm is, thus, an increasing function of λ whenever the acquisition constraint does not
bind.
For 1 > λ ≥ λb, p is equal to p and its value is given by (22). When λ increases from λb,t h e np
must increase accordingly, to keep equality (22) satisﬁed. When λ is close to 1, p also approaches 1




(p) should approach inﬁnity. Eventually, the proﬁtm u s tt h e nb e c o m e
(inﬁnitely) negative. This shows the existence of λ∗. Unicity is guaranteed by the continuity of the
equilibrium proﬁt function.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n7 .We want to show that there exist some values of λ verifying λ > θ,s u c h
that the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm is greater when a manager participates in decision-making (i.e., is oﬀered an
41incentive contract). We ﬁrst compute the value of Bdc for λ = θ, which is equal to
Bdc = 1







4 (2 − p(1 + θ))(1 − θ)L.




2 (1 − θ)
¢
G − 1
2 (1 − θ)L when λ = θ.
The diﬀerence between the two expressions above can be written as
∆Bnic = 1
4 (1 + θ)(1− θ)p(G + L) − 1
2 (2(1 + θ)+( 1− θ)(1+θ)p)C
0
(p)
and is positive only if
(1 + θ)(1− θ)p(G + L) ≥ 2(2(1+θ)+( 1− θ)(1+θ)p)C
0
(p) (26)
is veriﬁed. When λ = θ, we know that since the information acquisition constraint is not binding, the
optimal level of eﬀort p∗ (θ) > 0 is given by the ﬁrst order condition. From (21) we have







By replacing G + L in (26) by its expression from the equation above, we obtain
1
2 (1 − θ)(p∗ (θ))
2 C
00





This is true for any p>0 if, and only if, the function g(p)=1





greater than f (p)=C
0
(p).F o r p =0 , those two functions are equal. The computation of the ﬁrst












By assumption 2, this is true when λ = θ.









00(p) > 0 .
This expression is always positive because the denominator is always positive over the range of λ,f o r



























´ > 0 .
By assumption 2, the denominator must be positive.
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Figure 3: The beneﬁto ft h eﬁrm when the complete search contract is oﬀered.
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Figure 4: Discriminating Contract.















G = L =200
Figure 5: The manager is given no incentive.


















Figure 6: Hiring a consultant can be proﬁtable, λ∗ is the optimal level of the consultant’s expertise.
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